

St. Andrews Dec^r 14 1854

My dear Sir John,

I am glad you have sent me Mill's letter, for there would be no fun if I was to have it all my own way, like a bull in a China Shop. The result of our experiment was just what have been expected, — what indeed was inevitable; for Mills admission that I was right would have been equivalent to an admission that he was wrong in all that he had ever done in philosophy. I sometimes chuckled at the dilemma to which I thought my book might reduce him if fairly piqued; but I never seriously doubted that he w[oul]d stand manfully to his own horn, & refuse to recant the labours of life-time. His point of opposition comes out at the conclusion of his letter where he denies that there are any "necessary truths of reason". He takes up as thrown down to him specially, as indeed it was, the gauntlet to be found in

§ 26 & § 30 of the
introduction. This was to
be expected, & is all
fair. But when he goes on
to find fault with the logic
of the book, his letter becomes
a curiosity which I would
gladly be allowed to print
(if the work ever reaches
a second edition) as a
confirmation of what I
advance regarding the
imbecillity of all
p[s]ychological thinking. The

Man who admits that it
is impossible to know
one thing without knowing
two things, & who yet
contends that two things
do not require to be
known whenever one
thing is known, must
either labour under
some strange misappre-
hension as to Props I
& II, or must have
a singularly constituted head[.]

I will return you the letter
when I have conned it a
little more

Yours aff[ectionately]

J.F. Ferrier