

Torquay

Dec. 5, 1854²

My dear Sir

I have been unable to answer earlier your note of the 10th of last month, having only found time to read the book³ you were so kind as to send me during a few days passed at this place before going abroad for the winter.⁴

Mr Ferrier has the rare merit in a controversialist, of complete fairness. He understands

the opinions of all the opponents whom he notices, as fully and states them as clearly and forcibly as his own. He has a very telling mode of discussion. His fabric of speculation is so effectively constructed, and imposing, that it almost ranks as a work of art. It is the romance of logic.

I should be very happy if I could add that I believed it had done, what the author is firmly persuaded it has — solved the problem which all philosophers from the first origin of speculation have been vainly

hammering at. On the contrary, it is depressing to me to see a man of so much capacity under what appears to me so deep a delusion. Truly the main hindrance of philosophy is not its intrinsic difficulties, great as they are, but the extreme rarity of men

who can reason. It is enough to make one despair of speculation when a man of so much talent and knowledge as this book displays, and who piques himself peculiarly on his reasoning faculty, commits nearly every fallacy set down in books of logic, and this

at all the most critical points of his argument. He says that whoever admits his first proposition, must admit all the rest. I do not admit his first proposition⁵ but even if I did, his first great paralogism as it seems to me consists in thinking that his second proposition⁶ follows⁷ from his first, and there is a similar or a still greater logical blunder each time that he makes any really fresh advance in his argument. The whole system is one great specimen of reasoning in a circle. Unless each successive

conclusion is presupposed, it is impossible to admit the premises in the sense in which alone they can support it. All this I am satisfied I could prove to you book in hand, in an hour's conversation. Before I had finished the book I understood his mode of proceeding so well that I could generally see beforehand in what manner he was going to beg the next question. The effect is most disheartening — for when a writer who can so well point out the fallacies of others, builds an

entire system of philosophy on paralogisms,
what confidence is it possible to feel
in avoiding them — and how vain seems
all hope that one has done or can do
anything to help these subjects forward.
The only thing which alleviates this
discouragement is the belief that the
author was from the first on a wrong
tack — as all metaphysicians, in
my opinion, will be, until they
leave off revolving in the eternal round
of Descartes and Spinoza (of the former
of whom this book continually reminds
me), and cease to imagine that
philosophy can be founded on "necessary
truths of reason" or indeed that there
are such things as necessary truths —
any at least which can be known to
be necessary, in the metaphysical
sense of the word. Pray excuse
the seeming crudity with which
I have expressed the opinion you
asked from me — it has not been
crudely formed.

I am Dear Sir

very truly yours

J. S. Mill

注1 自筆下書き前半は、LSE [The British Library of Political and Economic Science, at the London School of Economics and Social Science] 所蔵、残りは、Leeds [Brotherton Library, University of Leeds] 所蔵。エリオット、第1巻、184-185頁に公開済み [Elliot, *The Letters of John Stuart Mill*, ed. Hugh S. R. Elliot, 2 vol., London, 1910]。

医者で、インドとペルシアで勤務した外交官のマクニール (Sir John McNeill. 1795-1883) は、1845年スコットランド救貧法管理委員会委員長に任命され、そして、クリミアにおける軍補給調査任務 (commission of inquiry on the supplying of troops in the Crimea) に

参加した。

2 日付けはエリオットによるもの。下書きには日付はない。

3 James Ferrier, 『形而上学原理: 知と存在の理論』*Institutes of Metaphysic, The Theory of Knowing and Being* ([William Blackwood and Sons] Edinburgh and London, 1854) .

ジェームズ・フレデリック・フェリア (James Frederick Ferrier, 1808-1864) は、1845年から1864年まで、セント・アンドリューズ大学の道徳哲学および経済学教授であった。

4 ミルは、妻を〔イングランド南西部〕トーキー (Torquay) に連れて行き、彼女は冬をそこで過ごした。その後ミルは、ロンドンを1854年12月8日に離れて、イタリア、シシリーそしてギリシャを含む長期旅行に向かった。ミルは妻と、1855年6月22日パリで再会した。

5 「あらゆる知性が知るところのものと共に、知の根拠あるいは条件として、知には、知それ自体の認識がなければならない。」 "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself." [Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, p.75.]

6 「知の対象は、それがどんなものであろうとも、対象として自然にあるいは普段にとらえられている以上のものであるのが常である。対象は常に、自分自身がつけ加えられたもの——対象プラス主体——であり、そうあらねばならない。すなわち、自分と共にあるものあるいは思考なのである。自我は、認識のあらゆる対象の完全で必要不可欠な一部分である。」 "The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of oneself,— object *plus* subject,— thing, or thought, *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." [Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, p.93.]

7 LSE 所蔵自筆下書き部分はここで終わっている。